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This paper presents spatial models of policy making in the Eu-
ropean Union and focuses on informational asymmetries and interest 
group lobbying.  It determines optimal lobbying strategies under the 
EU's three principal legislative procedures:  the consultation, cooper-
ation and codecision procedures.  Lobbying is  modeled as a game of 
strategic information transmission as in Austen-Smith (1993).  The 
paper studies agenda,  amendment and vote stage lobbying.  At the 
agenda stage an interest group can lobby the Commission.  At the 
amendment and vote stages it can lobby the Council and the Parlia-
ment. The paper finds that at the amendment stage an interest group 
lobbies the institution whose preferences are closer to its own. It lob-
bies the institution whose preferences are further from its own at the 
vote stage. 
1 1  Introduction 
The institutions of the European Union  (EU)  play an increasingly impor-
tant role in European political and economic life.  Not surprisingly, interest 
groups have reacted to this evolution by establishing offices in Brussels and 
developing EU level lobbying strategies.  The number of lobbyists active in 
Brussels has been growing steadily.  1 
The ever more prominent role of EU institutions has also given rise to a 
substantial literature on EU institutions and on the EU legislative process. 
It includes theoretical analyses of the EU's principal legislative procedures, 
amongst others by Crombez (1996,  1997), Steunenberg (1994)  and Tsebelis 
(1994).2 
Surprisingly, studies of policy making in the EU have so far ignored the 
role of interest groups and lobbyists in the legislative process.  Nonetheless, 
interest groups have received considerable attention in the political economics 
literature.  This paper is  a first attempt at introducing interest groups in a 
formal model of EU policy making. 
There are different types of models of interest groups in the literature.3 
In some models interest groups compete for goods supplied by politicians or 
bureaucrats.  In other models, interest groups offer campaign contributions 
to politicians in exchange for  services.  In a third set of models politicians 
maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of different interest groups.  A fourth 
set of models focuses on the informational role of interest groups.  Interest 
groups are generally better informed on issues that affect them than policy 
makers are.  They can thus playa role in the policy process by transmitting 
their private information to the relevant policy makers.  The concerns of the 
interest groups are rarely identical to the policy makers' concerns, however. 
As  a  result,  privately informed  interest  groups  have  incentives  to behave 
strategically when transmitting information to policy makers.4 
This  paper builds  on models  of strategic information  transmission  by 
Gilligan  and Krehbiel  (1987)  and Austen-Smith  (1993).  It studies  inter-
est groups'  opportunities for  strategic information transmission under the 
EU's three principal legislative  procedures:  the consultation,  cooperation 
IThere is a significant descriptive literature on lobbying in the EU. See,  for  example, 
Mazey and Richardson (1994),  Pedler and Van Schendelen (1994),  and Van Schendelen 
(1993). 
2For an excellent descriptive analysis of EU institutions and procedures,  see Nugent 
(1994). 
3See Austen-Smith (1997) and Van Winden (1997) for an overview of theoretical models 
of interest group lobbying. 
4See, for  example, Becker  (1983),  Baron (1989),  Grossman and Helpman (1994)  and 
Potters and Van Winden (1992) for representatives of these four sets of models respectively. 
2 and codecision procedures.  EU legislative procedures consist of agenda and 
vote stages, and the codecision procedure also includes an amendment stage. 
At the agenda stage interest groups can lobby the Commission.  At the vote 
stage they can lobby the Council and (under the cooperation and codecision 
procedures)  the Parliament.  At the amendment stage they can lobby the 
Council and the Parliament. 
The paper is  organized as follows.  Section two presents the model.  Sec-
tions three, four and five  analyze the results under the consultation, coop-
eration and codecision procedures respectively.  I formulate  conclusions in 
section six.  In equilibrium interest groups lobby the policy maker (the Par-
liament or the pivotal country in the Council) whose preferences are furthest 
away from its own at the vote stage.  At the amendment stage they lobby the 
policy maker (the Parliament or the pivotal country in the Council) whose 
preferences are closer. 
2  The Model 
I  present  a  spatial model of EU policy making focusing  on informational 
asymmetries and interest group lobbying.5  An EU policy p  is  represented 
by a point in a unidimensional policy space.  EU policy making can then be 
thought of as choosing a point in the policy space.  Policy results are uncertain 
to EU policy makers, however.  The EU policy makers are the Commission, 
the Parliament, and the countries as represented in the Council.  The lobbyist 
L, by contrast, has perfect information on policy results, and can transmit 
information to the policy makers. 
The result r of policy p depends on an exogenous parameter t. In particu-
lar, the result r  = p - t, and t is uniformly distributed over the unit interval. 
Policy makers do not know the value of t, but the lobbyist does. 
I assume that countries have Euclidean preferences over results, with ideal 
result rk for country k, i.e., country k prefers results that are closer to rather 
than further away from its ideal result.  Parliamentarians and Commission-
ers are also assumed to have Euclidean preferences over results.  Since the 
Parliament and the Commission use simple majority rule and have  no  re-
strictions on amendments, they can be treated as  unitary actors with ideal 
results rp and rc  respectively.6  The lobbyist L also has Euclidean preferences 
and has ideal result ri.  Each actor i thus has preferences over results of the 
following form:  Ui(r) = - (ri - r)2 . Actor i's induced preferences over poli-
5The modeling of information transmission is similar to Austen-Smith (1993).  Policy 
making is as in Crombez (1996, 1997). 
GIn other words, Black's median voter theorem applies.  See Black (1958). 
3 cies are then:  Ui (p)  =  E[Ui (p - t) I.]  =  - (ri  - P + E(tI.))2 - var(tl.), where 
the expectations are conditional on all information i  possesses. 
The countries,  the Parliament, the Commission and the lobbyist know 
each other's preferences, the location of the status quo q, and the sequential 
structure of the legislative process.  An equilibrium consists of strategies and 
beliefs for  each country, the Parliament, the Commission and the lobbyist. 
Strategies tell the countries, the Parliament, the Commission and the lob-
byist what actions to choose in the relevant stages of the legislative process, 
given their beliefs about what happened in the prior stages of the legislative 
process.  The equilibrium concept is sequential.  In a sequential equilibrium, 
neither the lobbyist nor any policy maker can increase his utility by choosing 
another strategy, given his  beliefs about what happened in prior stages of 
the legislative process and given the other actors' strategies.  Moreover, the 
actors' beliefs about what happened in prior stages should be consistent with 
the actors' strategies in prior stages. 
A lobbying strategy is informative if it changes the listener's beliefs about 
the value of t. It is influential if the listener's subsequent decision is different 
depending on the message received.  A lobbying strategy is at least as influ-
ential as another lobbying strategy, if it elicits at least as many actions.  In 
this paper I focus on most influential equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the 
lobbying strategies are at least as influential as any other lobbying strategy. 
I now look at the sequential structure of policy making and information 
transmission under the EU's three principal legislative procedures:  the con-
sultation, cooperation and codecision procedures. 
2.1  The Consultation Procedure 
The sequence of events and decisions  under the consultation procedure is 
shown in Figure 1.  It is  essentially a  closed rule procedure.  First Nature 
chooses the value of the parameter t.  The lobbyist L  privately observes this 
value.  The policy makers know the distribution of t, and they know that L 
observes t. 
The lobbyist  L  subsequently decides whether to lobby the Commission 
C  at the agenda stage.  Lobbying is assumed to be cost  less throughout the 
model.  It consists of sending a message to the Commission.  The message 
contains information on the value of t.  The lobbyist cannot prove that the 
information he provides is correct, and thus has an incentive to behave strate-
gically.  I assume that the countries can observe whether the Commission is 
lobbied, but that they do not observe the content of the message. 
Next, the Commission proposes a policy p. In the Council M the countries 
then compare the proposed policy to the status quo q.  The Council can 
















accept or reject the proposal.  Prior to the vote in the Council, the lobbyist 
can lobby the countries in the Council.  The countries can observe which 
countries are lobbied, but they do not observe the content of the messages 
to other countries. 
To defeat the status quo in the Council a qualified majority of 62  out of 
a total of 87 votes is needed.7  The country u that is  pivotal for  an upward 
move (p  ~ q)  thus has a lower ideal result than the country with the median 
vote.  In particular, country u  is  the country with the 26th vote (from the 
bottom up).  Country u  and the countries  with higher  ideal results then 
have 62  votes, and the countries with higher ideal results do not constitute 
a qualified majority without country u.  The country d that is pivotal for  a 
downward move is the country with the 62nd vote. 
2.2  The Cooperation Procedure 
The structure of the cooperation procedure is  shown in Figure 2.  There is 
one difference  with the consultation procedure.  Not only the Council M, 
but also the Parliament P  votes on the Commission proposal.  Its approval 
is required for  adoption.  The lobbyist can also lobby the Parliament at the 
vote stage. 
7France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain 8; Belgium, 
Greece,  Portugal and the Netherlands  5 each;  Austria and Sweden 4  each;  Denmark, 
Finland and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2. 
















2.3  The Codecision Procedure 
MandP 
vote 
Under the codecision procedure,  shown in Figure 3,  the countries and the 
Parliament can amend the Commission proposal in a Conciliation Commit-
tee.  I assume they can simultaneously propose one amendment each.  Prior 
to the amendment stage the lobbyist can lobby the countries and the Parlia-
ment.  I assume that the countries and the Parliament can observe whether a 
policy maker is lobbied, but that they cannot observe the contents of the mes-
sages to other policy makers.  The Parliament and the Council subsequently 
vote on the amendments.  An amendment is accepted if the Parliament and 
a qualified majority in the Council approve it. 
At  the end of the procedure the Council  and the Parliament vote on 
the proposal.  The Council uses qualified majority rule.  Prior to the votes 
the lobbyist can lobby the Parliament and the countries.  Again,  I  assume 
that the countries and the Parliament can observe whether a policy maker is 
lobbied, but that they cannot observe the contents of the messages to other 
policy makers. 
3  The Consultation Procedure 
The analysis of lobbying under the consultation procedure is  similar to the 
analysis by Austen-Smith (1993).  In this section, I discuss the results in an 
EU context.  I  make some specific assumptions concerning the location of 
ideal results  ..  In particular, I assume that the interest group L  and country 
d want to move up for  all values of t.  For example, they want more protec-
tionism than the status quo provides, whatever the job losses of free  trade. 
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As a result, there is no qualified majority for less protectionism whatever the 
value of t.  Furthermore, I assume that the lobbyist wants more protectionism 
than the policy makers. 
3.1  Voting 
At the vote stage the countries compare the proposed policy p to the status 
quo q.  Country i  then votes in favor  of the proposal if its induced utility 
Ui (p)  under the proposal is  higher than its induced utility Ui (q)  under the 
status quo.  Country i's induced utility under the proposal is  equal to its 
expected utility E[Ui (p - t) I.]  =  - (ri - P + E(tl.))2  -var(tl.).  Similarly, 
country i's induced  utility under the status quo  is  equal to its  expected 
utility E[Ui (q  - t) I.]  = - (ri - q + E(tl.))2 -var(tl.). Country i then votes 
in favor, if the expected result p - E(tl.) of the proposal is closer to country 
i's ideal result ri  than is the expected result q - E(tl.) of the status quo.  An 
upward move p  >  q is  thus accepted if and only if the following  condition 
holds: 
p + q - 2E(tl·) 
2  ::;  ru'  (1) 
This condition states that country u's ideal result should be higher than 
the average of the expected results of the proposal and the status quo.  A 
qualified majority in the Council than votes for  an upward move.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.  In the Figure country U  beliefs that the parameter t 
is uniformly distributed over the unit interval. 








3.2  Vote Stage Lobbying 
q-t 
t 
Vote stage lobbying can elicit at most two actions:  "vote in favor"  and "vote 
against."  Without loss of generality, I therefore focus on vote stage lobbying 
strategies in which the lobbyist only sends two messages:  "vote in favor"  and 
"vote against."  The lobbyist only lobbies the pivotal country u.  Countries 
with higher ideal results than country u  vote in favor.  They know that a 
proposal is  only accepted if country u  votes  in favor,  and that they also 
prefer the proposal to the status quo if country u  does. 
Suppose that at the vote stage the countries believe that the parameter 
t  is uniformly distributed over the interval  [:L  ~ . Then, the lobbyist cannot 
credibly send the message  "vote in favor"  ("vote  against"),  if he  prefers 
the status quo (proposal) for  all values of t  E  [t, ~.  Lobbying can only be 
informative if the lobbyist prefers the status quo for some values of t and the 
proposal for other values. 
If the lobbyist prefers the proposal for t  =  t, he prefers the proposal for 
all t  E  [t, ~  ,since the proposal is  higher than the status quo.  Thus, he can 
only engage in informative vote stage lobbying if he prefers the status quo 
for  t  =  t, i.e.  if rl  :::;  p+r2.t.  Similarly,  the lobbyist prefers the status quo 
for  all t  E  [t,  ~, if he prefers the status quo for  t  =  t.  Thus, he can only 
8 engage in informative vote stage lobbying if he prefers the proposal for t  =  t, 
i.e.  if p+r2t < rz.  Informative vote stage lobbying strategies consist of the 
message "vote in favor"  if the lobbyist prefers the proposal to the status quo, 
and "vote against"  if he prefers the status quo.  Other vote stage lobbying 
strategies are not credible.  In a most influential equilibrium the lobbyist thus 
engages in informative vote stage lobbying on an upward move if and only if: 
p + q - 2t  p + q - 2t.. 
(2)  <  rz  < 
2  - 2 
p + q - 2rz 
< t.  (3)  {:}  t<  - - 2 
In Figure  4  the lobbyist  engages  in informative lobbying,  because he 
prefers the status quo for  low  values t  E  [t..,  p+q;-2r1]  ,  but prefers the pro-
posal for high values t  E  ] p+q;-2r1, t] . The value t = p+g;-2r1 is the value that 
makes the lobbyist indifferent between the status quo and the proposal.  The 
lobbyist sends the message "vote against" for low t,  "vote in favor"  for high 
t. 
Informative lobbying does not imply influential lobbying,  however.  For 
informational lobbying to be influential, it needs to be in the lobbied coun-
try's interests to follow the lobbyist's advice.  Suppose country u receives the 
message "vote against."  It then votes against the proposal if p+q-;E(tl.)  > ru. 
Country u knows that the lobbyist sends the message "vote against" for low 
values of t, if he can engage in informative vote stage lobbying.  In particular 
the lobbyist sends this message in interval  [t..,  p+q;-2rl].  The expected value 
.  t+p+q-2rl  .  . 
of t  IS  then - 22  .  Havmg receIved the message  "vote against"  country 
+  -(t+ p+q-2r1) 
U  then votes  against  if  p  q  -'- 2  2  >  ru  <===?  ~-1;.> 2ru  - rz.  Simi-
larly, country u votes in favor, having received the message "vote in favor"  if 
y  - t :::;  2ru - rz.  Vote stage lobbying on an upward move is thus influential 
in interval [1;., n  if and only if both these conditions hold, i.e., 
p + q - 2t  p + q - 21;. 
---- < 2ru - rz  < ---- 2  - 2  (4) 
In Figure 4 informative vote stage lobbying is influential, because country 
u  prefers  the status quo when it receives  the message  "vote against"  and 
prefers the proposal when it receives the message "vote in favor." 
The following proposition summarizes these results. 
Proposition 1  Lobbying  the  Council on a proposal p >  q is influential in 
interval [1;., n  if and only if the following two  conditions hold:  (1) the interest 
9 group  L  prefers  the  status  quo  q  for t  =  t  and prefers  the proposal p  for 
t = i  i.e.  p+r2t < 1'z  ~  p+~-2!; and (2)  country u  prefers the status quo q  in 
interval [t,  p+q;2rl ]  and the proposal p  in interval  [p+q;-2rl , i] , i. e.  p+r2t < 
21'  - r  <  p+q-2!  u  1_  2  . 
The first condition states that the interest groups should be able to cred-
ibly send different signals. It can send two signals:  (1)  vote for the proposal 
and (2)  vote against the proposal. If  the interest group prefers the proposal 
(status quo) for all possible values of t, the countries know it is always in its 
interest to signal "vote for  (against) the proposal".  So,  they do not update 
their beliefs and lobbying is  not informative. 
The second condition requires that having received the signal  "vote for 
(against)"  it should then be in country u's interest  to vote for  (against). 
Otherwise,  lobbying would not be influential.  The conditions thus require 
that the interest group be (1)  not too extreme and (2)  close enough to the 
pivotal voter in the Council. 
Since the proposal consists of an upward move, influential lobbying leads 
the proposal's defeat for small values of t, whereas it leads to its approval for 
large values. If  in the absence of lobbying, the proposal were to be approved, 
influential lobbying allows the interest group to achieve the bill's defeat for 
small values  of t.  If the proposal were  to be defeated in the absence  of 
lobbying, influential lobbying allows the interest group to secure its approval 
for large values. 
3.3  Agenda Setting 
The Commission proposes the policy that maximizes  its expected  utility 
given its beliefs on t.  These beliefs depend on the message that the lobbyist 
sends at the agenda stage.  Suppose the Commission beliefs that t  E  [t, i] . 
The Commission's expected utility depends on whether the lobbyist engages 
in influential vote stage lobbying and whether a  qualified  majority in the 
Council approves the proposal.  As seen above,  an upward move needs ap-
proval by country u  to be adopted.  The interest group L  lobbies country u 
at the vote stage if its preferences are not too extreme and close enough to 
country u's preferences. 
To  propose the policy that maximizes its expected utility without vote 
stage lobbying, the Commission solves the following problem: 
Maxpuc(p)  - (rc - p + E (tl.))2 - var(tl.) 
S.t. p  <  2(ru + E(tl.)) - q 
10 
(5) 





P  :s;  2(rz + tJ - q.  (7) 
Equation 5 represents the Commission's expected utility as  a  function 
of policy p.  Equation 6 is  obtained from equation 1.  It requires that the 
policy P be preferred to the status quo by country u.  Equation 7 is obtained 
from equation 2 and states that the policy p  should be low enough for  the 
lobbyist to prefer the proposal over the entire interval.  The Commission then 
proposes the policy such that the expected result is equal to its ideal result, 
unless country u  prefers the status quo to this policy or the lobbyist prefers 
the status quo for t = t..  Then it proposes a lower policy. 
In Figure 5 the Commission  proposes the policy PI  if he  believes that 
t  is  low,  otherwise he  proposes the policy P2.  Both policies  maximize the 
Commission's expected utility in the corresponding intervals.  The expected 
results are equal to the Commission's ideal result. 
To propose the policy that maximizes its expected utility with vote stage 
lobbying, the Commission solves the following problem: 
11 -C  -, p:rn) ((ro  p + E (tl·))2 + var(tl·)) 
s.t.p>  2(rz+t:..)-q 




Equation 8 represents the Commission's expected utility as a function of 
policy p.  Equation 9 is obtained from equation 2.  It requires that the policy 
P be high enough for the lobbyist to prefer the status quo for t =  f.  Equation 
10  is  obtained from equation 4 and states that the policy P should be low 
enough for  country u  to prefer the proposal to the status quo if it receives 
the message "vote in favor."  The optimal policy with vote stage lobbying is 
higher than the optimal policy without vote stage lobbying.  between the two 
optimal policies the Commission chooses the one that maximizes its expected 
utility. 
3.4  Agenda Stage Lobbying 
At the agenda stage the lobbyist sends the following type of message:  "t is in 
interval [I,  ~  ."  If the lobbyist's preferences are identical to the Commission's, 
he truthfully reveals the value of t,  and the Commission beliefs him.  Since 
the Commission acts in its own self interest and the lobbyist's interests are 
identical to the Commission's,  the lobbyist has no  incentive not to reveal 
the value of t.  As the lobbyist's preferences become more different from the 
Commission's, the lobbyist has an incentive to behave strategically.  He can, 
therefore,  not truthfully report the true value of t.  He can only truthfully 
report intervals in which the value of tis. 
Suppose, for example, that the lobbyist is  sufficiently close to the Com-
mission to send two different messages in the most influential equilibrium:  t 
is low, t  ::;  i,  or t is high, t > i.  Having received the message "t  is low"  the 
Commission then chooses the proposal PI that maximizes its expected utility 
given belief t  ::;  i.  Having received the message "t  is  high"  the Commission 
then chooses the proposal P2  that maximizes its expected utility given belief 
t  > i.  The equilibrium policy PI  is lower than the equilibrium policy P2.  The 
lobbyist prefers a higher policy than the Commission proposal for low as well 
as for high t.  In equilibrium, he does not have an incentive to misrepresent 
the value of t, however.  This implies that he is indifferent between the Com-
mission's two proposals for t  =  i (or between the status quo and a proposal 
if one of the proposals is voted down at i). 
As the lobbyist's preferences become more and more different from the 
Commission's, the number of intervals is reduced and the intervals get larger. 
12 If  the lobbyist is too far from the Commission, he cannot credibly transmit 
any information at the agenda stage. 
Proposition 2  As the  lobbyists  is  closer to  the  Commission,  agenda stage 
lobbying  is  more influential.  It is  only  influential if the  interest group  is 
sufficiently close to the  Commission. 
The proposed policies become higher as the expected value of t increases, 
and the lobbyist is indifferent between two proposals (or between the status 
quo and a proposal if one of the proposals is  voted down at the separating 
point) at the separating point between the two corresponding intervals. 
Suppose now one of two proposals is voted down at the relevant separating 
point. If  it were the higher one, this would imply that the policy proposed in 
the lower interval were lower than the status quo.  In equilibrium this does 
not occur,  as  there is  no qualified majority for  a  downward move  for  any 
value of t.  If  it is the lower one, this implies that the status quo prevails for 
all lower values of t. As a resul, vote stage lobbying only occurs in the lowest 
interval. 
Proposition 3  Vote  stage lobbying  only occurs in the  lowest interval,  'l. e. 
for the smallest values of t. 
4  Cooperation Procedure 
Under the cooperation procedure the Parliament has veto power, as demon-
strated by Crombez (1996).  A  Commission proposal thus needs to be ap-
proved by a qualified majority in the Council and by the Parliament to be-
come EU policy.  At the vote stage the lobbyist can lobby any of the countries 
as well as the Parliament. In this section I focus on vote stage lobbying, be-
cause the other steps of the procedure and agenda stage lobbying are similar 
to the consultation procedure. 
Suppose both country u and the Parliament approve a proposed upward 
move in the absence of lobbying.  Since the lobbyist prefers a higher policy 
than country u and the Parliament, he prefers the move to the status quo as 
well.  The lobbyist can then engage in informative lobbying if he prefers the 
status quo to the proposal in a subset of the interval.  Informative lobbying 
is then influential, because country u and the Parliament then also prefer the 
status quo.  For the proposal to be rejected, it suffices that either country u 
or the Parliament reject it.  So,  the lobbyist can lobby either country u  or 
the Parliament. 
13 Suppose now country u approves a proposed upward move in the absence 
of lobbying, but the Parliament does not.  This means that the Parliament 
has a lower ideal result than country u.  The proposal is thus defeated in the 
absence of lobbying.  It can pass in a subset of the interval, for  high values 
of t, if the lobbyist can influentially lobby the Parliament. Lobbying country 
u, however,  does not affect the adoption or rejection of the proposal.  The 
lobbyist can engage in informative lobbying, if he prefers the status quo to the 
proposal for  low values of t.  Informatively lobbying the Parliament is  then 
influential if the lobbyist's preferences are close enough to the Parliament's. 
The analysis is analogous if the Parliament approves a proposed upward move 
in the absence of lobbying, but country u does not. 
Suppose neither country u nor the Parliament prefer the proposal to the 
status quo in the absence of lobbying.  The proposal is  then defeated in the 
absence of lobbying.  It can pass in a subset of the interval, for high values of 
t, if the lobbyist can influentially lobby country u and the Parliament. As in 
the previous case, the further one is  pivotal.  As  a result, the lobbyist need 
only pay attention to him.  The lobbyist can engage in informative lobbying, 
if he prefers the status quo to the proposal for low values of t.  Informatively 
lobbying the further one is  influential if the lobbyist's preferences are close 
enough to his.  If the Parliament (country u)  is  further and being lobbied, 
country u  (the Parliament) has no  incentive to reject the proposal.  If the 
Parliament (country u) prefers the proposal to the status quo, country u (the 
Parliament) does too.  If the Parliament (country 'I./.)  prefers the status quo, 
the proposal will be rejected in any case. 
Proposition 4  Under the cooperation procedure a Commission proposal needs 
approval by the Parliament and the pivotal country in the Council.  At the vote 
stage the lobbyist lobbies the Parliament or the pivotal country,  whichever is 
further away from itself. 
5  Codecision Procedure 
In this section I focus on agenda and amendiLient stage lobbying.  Vote stage 
lobbying is  as under cooperation,  because Lhe vote stage itself is  as  under 
cooperation. 
5.1  Amendment Stage Lobbyin~g 
At the amendment stage an amendment needs the approval of the Parliament 
and a  qualified majority in the Council.  The Parliament and any country 
14 can propose amendments.  Prior to the amendment stage the lobbyist can 
lobby the Parliament and the countries. 
Suppose the Commission proposal cannot be amended unless the Par-
liament or a  country gets new information from the lobbyist.  Amendment 
stage lobbying is then similar to agenda stage lobbying.  The lobbyist can 
engage in influential amendment stage lobbying if it is sufficiently close to the 
Parliament or the countries.  It can transmit more information if it is closer 
to the Parliament and the countries.  Therefore, it lobbies the country that is 
closest to itself, if it is  closer than the Parliament.  Otherwise, it lobbies the 
Parliament. In equilibrium the lobbyist does not engage in amendment stage 
lobbying if the Commission is closer than the Parliament and all countries. 
Suppose the Commission proposal can be amended even in the absence 
of amendment stage lobbying.  A successful amendment would then be pro-
posed.  The Commission anticipates this and does not make such proposals. 
Proposition 5  At the  amendment stage the lobbyist  engages in influential 
amendment stage  lobbying  if he  is  close  enough  to  the  Parliament and the 
countries.  The  lobbyist  then lobbies  the Parliament or the  closest  country, 
whichever is  closer.  The  lobbyist  does  not engage  in amendment stage  lob-
bying if the  Commission is  closer to  itself than are  the  Parliament and all 
countries. 
5.2  Agenda Stage Lobbying 
If the Commission is closer to the lobbyist then are the Parliament and all 
countries,  agenda stage lobbying is  similar to agenda stage lobbying under 
cooperation.  If the Commission's ideal policy is  further,  the lobbyist does 
not engage in agenda stage lobbying. It prefers to lobby the Parliament or a 
country at the amendment stage. 
Proposition 6  The lobbyist only lobbies at the agenda stage if  the Commis-
sion is  closer to  itself than are  the Parliament and the  countries. 
6  Conclusions 
The spatial theory of ED policy  making and lobbying  characterizes opti-
mal proposal strategies for the Commission, optimal amendment and voting 
strategies for the countries and the Parliament, and optimal agenda, amend-
ment and vote stage lobbying strategies for  an interest group. 
15 The consultation procedure is essentially a closed rule procedure.  Optimal 
lobbying strategies are then similar to the strategies characterized by Austen-
Smith (1993).  A successful Commission proposal needs to be preferred to the 
status quo by a qualified majority in the Council.  The lobbyist then engages 
in influential vote stage lobbying if his preferences are not too extreme and 
close enough to the preferences of the pivotal country in the Council.  At the 
agenda stage he engages in influential lobbying if his  preferences are close 
enough to the preferences of the Commission.  The closer his preferences are 
to the preferences of the Commission, the more information he can transmit. 
The cooperation procedure is  also basically a closed rule procedure.  A 
successful  Commission proposal also  requires  approval by the Parliament, 
however, in addition to approval by the pivotal country in the Council. At the 
vote stage the lobbyist lobbies either the Parliament or the pivotal country 
in the Council, whichever's preferences are further from its own. 
In the codecision procedure the Parliament and the Council can amend 
the Commission  proposal.  At  the amendment stage the lobbyist  lobbies 
either the Parliament or the country whose  preferences  are closest  to its 
own, whichever's preferences are closer to its own. 
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